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IN RE PENNIE & EDMONDS: THE SECOND
CIRCUIT RETURNS TO A SUBJECTIVE
STANDARD OF BAD FAITH FOR IMPOSING




The American adversary system of civil litigation is
characterized in large part by the power of the parties to control
major aspects of the case.' As a practical matter, however,
advocates for the parties, not the litigants themselves, assume
primary responsibility for conducting the litigation-they select
the legal theories on which to base the complaint, develop the
evidence, conduct discovery, and ultimately try the case. 2 As an
agent of the represented party, the advocate must act zealously
and faithfully on behalf of her client.3 The duty owed to a client,
however, is not unqualified; it is balanced with the
responsibilities owed by a lawyer to the court. 4 This inherent
t J.D. Candidate, June 2005, St. John's University School of Law; B.S., 1994,
City College of New York.
I See GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & MICHELE TARUFFO, AMERICAN CIVIL
PROCEDURE: AN INTRODUCTION 86-87 (1993) ("Theoretically, the parties bear the
entire responsibility for presenting the law and the facts.").
2 See id. at 87-88 (noting that "the advocates are the architects of the
litigation").
3 See id. at 92 (stating that the advocate is required "to present all favorable
evidence, to mitigate unfavorable evidence by cross-examination and argument, and
to advance the most favorable interpretation of the law"). It is an old principle that
the primary duty of the advocate is to the client. See STEPHEN GILLERS,
REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND ETHICS 21 (6th ed. 2002)
(quoting often-repeated statement of Lord Brougham: " 'an advocate, in the
discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his
client"' (citing 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (J. Nightingale ed., 1821))).
4 See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 498 U.S. 533,
564 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("An attorney acts not only as a client's
representative, but also as an officer of the court, and has a duty to serve both
masters."); HAZARD & TARUFFO, supra note 1, at 92 ("In the adversary system, the
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conflict may potentially lead to situations when duties owed to a
client are fulfilled at the expense of obligations owed to the legal
system in general.5 Such disregard of the duties owed to the
court may, and too often does, manifest itself in the submission
of litigation papers that lack evidentiary or legal support.6
Filing such baseless papers has negative ramifications that go
beyond the particular conflict being litigated: courts' dockets are
clogged, 7 the public trust in the integrity of the legal system
diminishes,8 and the image of the legal profession suffers. 9
Courts are ultimately responsible for sanctioning lawyers for
abuse of the legal system and for filing baseless claims,
lawyer's duties to the court are delicately balanced with responsibilities to the
client."); Edward D. Re, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Legal
Profession, 68 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 85, 92 (1994) ("Lawyers in [the adversary] system
are not only advocates, who have a duty to represent clients competently and
zealously, but are also officers of the court, whose zeal is circumscribed by a
professional responsibility founded upon rules of law and principles of professional
ethics."). The basic duties to the court include obligations not to present false
evidence, to advise the court of adverse legal authority, and to be truthful in all
statements made to the court. See HAZARD & TARUFFO, supra note 1, at 92.
5 See HAZARD & TARUFFO, supra note 1, at 92-94 ("The adversary system
subjects the advocates to great incentives to ignore the duty to the court in favor of
the interest of the client."); Re, supra note 4, at 107 ("Unfortunately, some cases,
however frivolous, are pursued and presented because they are deemed to have
vexation value."); Charles M. Yablon, The Good, the Bad, and the Frivolous Case: An
Essay on Probability and Rule 11, 44 UCLA L. REV. 65, 69-76 (1996) (discussing the
economic rationale behind frivolous cases).
6 See Robert G. Bone, Modeling Frivolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 520-21
(1997) (stating that "there is widespread belief that frivolous litigation is out of
control .... Americans are simply too litigious ... and all too fond of filing meritless
suits"). See generally WARREN FREEDMAN, FRIVOLOUS LAWSUITS AND FRIVOLOUS
DEFENSES: UNJUSTIFIABLE LITIGATION (1987) (analyzing the nature of various
frivolous claims).
7 See Ari Dobner, Litigation for Sale, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1529, 1570 (1996)
("Frivolous lawsuits waste limited judicial resources and clog the courts' dockets,
preventing or delaying access to justice to other plaintiffs with meritorious claims.");
Re, supra note 4, at 107 ("The public perceives that lawyers file every conceivable
type of case, regardless of merit. As a result, the quantity of cases filed with the
courts has burdened court dockets and threatens the quality of justice.").
8 See James E. Ward IV, Rule 11 and Factually Frivolous Claims: The Goal of
Cost Minimization and the Client's Duty to Investigate, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1165,
1169-70 (1991) ("When the delay associated with resolving a dispute in court
becomes too great, the courts are unable to perform their function, and the public
loses confidence in the judicial process. Lack of confidence in the system and the
rule of law may result in increased lawlessness." (citations omitted)).
9 See Re, supra note 4, at 91-113 (analyzing the reasons for public
dissatisfaction with lawyers); Georgene Vairo, Rule 11 and the Profession, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 589, 644 (1998) (stating that "the public's mistrust and dislike for
lawyers is at an all-time high").
RULE 11 SANCTIONS
pleadings, and motions.10 Federal courts have both inherent
power11 and statutory authority 12 to sanction lawyers for
frivolous litigation conduct. 13 In recent decades, however, the
"weapon of choice" for judicial imposition of sanctions has been
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 4 Whereas other
10 Responsibility to deter unprofessional conduct is not exclusive to the
judiciary. The legal profession is largely self-regulated and the organized bar is a
major force in shaping the rules of professional behavior. See GILLERS, supra note 3,
at 1-7 (discussing the genesis of the rules regulating the conduct of attorneys).
Historically, however, the organized bar had not dealt effectively with the abuses of
the litigation process. See Vairo, supra note 9, at 629, 645 ("[Tlhe ethical codes have
not been successful in reining in the unprofessional conduct of many lawyers ....").
For a federal judge's view on the effectiveness of the bar disciplinary committees see
Kevin Thomas Duffy, Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: How
Go the Best Laid Plans?, 54 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 20 (1985):
Why do lawyers bring stupid, senseless, baseless lawsuits? Because they
get away with it. The organized bar itself is supposed to watch out for the
activities of lawyers. Has the organized bar met its own requirements?
Are lawyers still bringing stupid, senseless, baseless lawsuits? Sure. Why
aren't they disbarred? Well, they are not, and it is quite obvious to the
judiciary that if the organized bar is not going to clean its own house then
somebody has got to do something about it. Isn't it nice of the organized
bar to say, "Hey we have got a problem, let's pass it off to the judiciary."
Id.
11 See Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991) (reaffirming the
inherent power of federal courts to award counsel fees and expenses for bad-faith
litigation); United States v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 948 F.2d 1338, 1345 (2d Cir.
1991) (maintaining that "a court has a... means at its disposal for sanctioning
improper conduct: its inherent power" and that "[t]his power stems from the very
nature of courts").
12 Section 1927 of the United States Code provides the federal courts with
statutory authority to impose monetary sanctions against lawyers for unreasonable
and vexatious increase of litigation costs. The section provides:
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the
United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the proceedings in
any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by the court to
satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, and attorneys' fees reasonably
incurred because of such conduct.
28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2000).
13 See Chambers, 501 U.S. at 43.
14 While the 1993 amendments, see infra Part I.B.3, reduced the number of
Rule 11 proceedings, see Vairo, supra note 9, at 626, a brief search of district court
cases reported on computerized databases shows that when district courts
contemplate sanctions, Rule 11 cases continue to outnumber section 1927 and
"inherent power" cases. From January to November of 2003, 240 reported cases
imposing sanctions cited Rule 11. Search of WESTLAW, District Courts Database
(Oct. 31, 2003) (search for da (aft 01/0112003) & da (bef 10/31/2003) & sanction! &
("fed. r.civ. p. 11" "rule 11")). In the same time period, district courts cited "inherent
power" in 144 cases, id. (search for da (aft 01/01/2003) & da (bef 10/31/2003) &
sanction! & "inherent power"), and "§ 1927" in only 65 cases, id. (search for da (aft
01/01/2003) & da (bef 10/31/2003) & sanction! & "28 u.s.c. 1927").
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remedies require a showing of bad faith as a prerequisite for
sanctions, 15 Rule 11 authorizes sanctions on the basis of conduct
found to be unreasonable. 16 Since Rule 11 was amended in 1983,
the general understanding among courts1 7 and commentators 8
has been that an "unreasonable" submission will subject the
offender to sanctions. 19 Recently, however, in In re Pennie &
15 The Second Circuit has articulated the bad faith requirement for sanctions
under the inherent power doctrine. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 948 F.2d at 1345
("Mhis Court... has always required a particularized showing of bad faith to
justify the use of the court's inherent power."); see also id. (discussing sanctions
under section 1927 and stating that "[blad faith is the touchstone of an award under
[section 1927]").
16 Courts routinely rely on Rule 1l's authority to sanction attorneys for
unreasonable conduct. See, e.g., Worldwide Primates, Inc. v. McGreal, 87 F.3d 1252,
1254-55 (11th Cir. 1996) (unreasonable reliance on the conclusory statements of the
client); Zuk v. E. Pa. Psychiatric Inst. of the Med. Coll., 103 F.3d 294, 298-300 (3rd
Cir. 1996) (poor legal research); In re Cascade Energy & Metals Corp., 87 F.3d 1146,
1151 (10th Cir. 1996) (failure to correctly quote the statute on which the claim was
based). See generally Marguerite L. Butler, Rule 11 Sanctions and a Lawyer's
Failure to Conduct Competent Legal Research, 29 CAP. U. L. REV. 681 (2002)
(analyzing Rule l's implications on lawyers' duty to conduct competent research);
Vairo, supra note 9, at 605-18 (giving examples of various conduct sanctionable
under Rule 11).
17 See Ted Lapidus, S.A. v. Vann, 112 F.3d 91, 96 (2d Cir. 1997) ("Rule 11
requires only a showing of objective unreasonableness on the part of the attorney or
client signing the papers .... ); Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 293 (6th
Cir. 1997) ("[Ihe test for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions is whether the attorney's
conduct was reasonable under the circumstances."); Martin v. Brown, 63 F.3d 1252,
1264 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Rule 11 sanctions are based on 'an objective standard of
reasonableness under the circumstances.' " (citations omitted)); see also 2 JAMES
WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 11.11 n.30 (3d ed. 2003)
(providing a circuit-by-circuit listing of cases where the court applied an objective
standard for imposition of Rule 11 sanctions).
18 See 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 17, 11.11[3] (concluding that the courts
have interpreted "Rule 11 [as] establish[ing] an objective standard of reasonable
conduct for litigants and attorneys"); Edward D. Cavanagh, Developing Standards
Under Amended Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 14 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 499, 511 (1986) (pointing out that Rule 11 creates an affirmative obligation for
an attorney to make reasonable "prefiling inquiry with respect to both the facts and
the law"); Vairo, supra note 9, at 598 ("Bad faith findings [are] not required. Rather,
an attorney's conduct would be put to an objective test .. "); Yablon, supra note 5,
at 65 (1996) (commenting that "the determination that a claim is frivolous, and an
objective determination at that, has been a primary criterion for imposing liability
under Rule 11").
19 While some courts impose sanctions only when a prefiling inquiry into the
factual and legal merits of the claim is unreasonable and the paper ultimately filed
is also frivolous, see, e.g., FDIC v. Elefant, 790 F.2d 661, 667 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting
that sanctions are warranted "only when the failure to investigate leads to the
taking of an objectively unsupported position"), others will award sanctions
regardless of whether the claim itself is found to be frivolous, see, e.g., Garr v. U.S.
RULE 11 SANCTIONS
Edmonds LLP,20 a majority of a panel of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that attorneys could not
be sanctioned in a court-initiated post-trial proceeding in the
absence of a showing of subjective bad faith.21 The Second
Circuit grounded its conclusion on two propositions. 22 First, the
court claimed that the 1993 Advisory Committee's Note to Rule
11, which states that sua sponte sanctions ordinarily will be
imposed in situations where the attorney's conduct is "akin to a
contempt," compellingly indicates that the intent of the Advisory
Committee was to require something more serious than mere
unreasonable conduct before a court imposes sanctions. 23 The
court's reasoning was straightforward: because bad faith is
essential to a determination of contempt and because sua sponte
Rule 11 sanctions should be imposed only in situations that are
akin to contempt, it follows that a finding of bad faith is a
prerequisite to sua sponte sanctions as well.24 Second, the court
concluded that the heightened mens rea is justified as a matter
of good public policy. 25 According to the Second Circuit, a bad
faith requirement effectively counterbalances the risk that some
attorneys may withhold submissions that have plausible
evidentiary and legal support out of fear that their conduct will
be found unreasonable by the trial judge.26
This Comment argues that the Second Circuit erred in
imposing a bad faith requirement as a prerequisite for court-
initiated post-trial Rule 11 sanctions. It submits that neither
the express language, historical development, purpose of Rule
11, nor the policy considerations advanced by the court support
Healthcare, Inc., 22 F.3d 1274, 1281 (3d Cir. 1994). For a discussion of whether the
Rule 11 analysis should involve the "product approach," which focuses on the merits
of the filed paper, or the "conduct approach," which looks into the reasonableness of
the inquiry, see Vairo, supra note 9, at 607-09.
20 323 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2003).
21 Id. at 87. ("Ve conclude that where, as here, a sua sponte Rule 11 sanction
denies a lawyer the opportunity to withdraw the challenged document pursuant to
the 'safe harbor' provision of Rule 11(c)(1)(A), the appropriate standard is subjective
bad faith." (emphasis added)). Since a dispositive summary judgment ruling is the
functional equivalent of a trial, the term "post-trial" is used in this Comment to
describe invocation of sua sponte sanctions during both post-summary judgment and
post-trial adjudication.
22 Id. at 89-91.
23 Id. at 89-90.
24 Id. at 90.
25 Id. at 90-91.
26 Id. at 91.
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the imposition of a separate mens rea element for any subset of
Rule 11 sanctions. Application of two distinct standards for
punishing the same behavior, depending on whether the
sanction proceedings are on-motion or sua sponte, will bring
confusion to the operation of Rule 11, may encourage meritless
filings, and may, in some situations, have an adverse effect on
attorneys who act in subjective good faith. Furthermore, this
Comment submits that the likely ramification of the Second
Circuit's holding is a limitation, and a possible elimination, of
district courts' power to sanction attorneys for unreasonable
conduct associated with the filing of motions, pleadings, and
other papers. Such a result may hamper judges' power to control
their courtrooms and may greatly reduce the role of the judiciary
in curbing unprofessional conduct.
Part I of this Comment examines the current language of
Rule 11 and its historical development. Part II provides the
factual and procedural background to the issue raised in In re
Pennie & Edmonds and details the reasoning of the majority and
dissenting opinions. Part III analyzes and questions the Pennie
court's rationale and holding and then discusses the likely
impact of the case on the effectiveness of Rule 11. Part IV sets
forth possible alternatives that may provide some basic
protection for lawyers who act in good faith without offending
the plain meaning of Rule 11.
I. RULE 11 OF THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: TEXT
AND HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
A. The Current Version
Rule 11 provides that every pleading, written motion, or
other paper presented to a federal district court must be signed
either by the attorney or, if the party is unrepresented, by the
litigant herself.27 The signature constitutes a certification that
"to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief,
formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances" the
allegations and claims have evidentiary and legal support and
that the filing "is not being presented for any improper
purpose."28  If the conditions implied by the certification are
27 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(a).
28 Id. 11(b). Rule 11(b) in its entirety provides that:
[Vol.78:449
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violated, the court, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to
respond, may impose appropriate sanctions upon the violator.29
The proceeding for sanctions may be initiated by motion of the
opposing counsel 30 or on the court's own initiative. 31 When the
sanctions proceeding is initiated by motion of a litigant, the
offending party has the protection of a so-called "safe harbor"
provision: no sanctions are allowed if the attorney withdraws or
corrects the offending document within twenty-one days after
the Rule 11 motion is served. 32 There is no "safe harbor,"
however, when the inquiry is initiated by the court.33
The text of the rule also defines the nature of sanctions. 34 "A
sanction imposed for violation of this rule shall be limited to
what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or
comparable conduct by others similarly situated."3 5  While the
determination of what is "sufficient" rests largely on the
discretion of the trial judge,36 the rule imposes important
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or
unrepresented party is certifying that to the best of the person's
knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable
under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass or
to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law;
(3) the allegations and other factual contentions have evidentiary support
or, if specifically so identified, are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if






32 Id. 11(c)(1)(A) ("[Miotion for sanctions ... shall not be filed with or presented
to the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion ... the challenged
paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not withdrawn or
appropriately corrected.").
33 Id. ll(c)(1)(A), (B).
34 Id. 11(c)(2).
35 Id.
36 See id. ("[T]he sanction may consist of, or include, directives of a
nonmonetary nature, an order to pay a penalty into court, or... an order directing
payment to the movant of some or all of the reasonable attorney fees and other
expenses incurred as a direct result of the violation."); id. 11 advisory committee's
2004]
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limitations when the court initiates a sanctions proceeding:
awarding of attorney fees to opposing counsel is not permitted 37
and other monetary sanctions can be imposed only if the show
cause order was issued before any voluntary dismissal or
settlement. 38
The language of Rule l's reasonableness standard for
attorney conduct is relatively simple and straightforward, 39 but,
as the Pennie panel's split decision demonstrates, difficulties of
interpretation still exist. The context of Rule l's historical
development proves a basis for understanding its standard for
sanctions. 40
B. Historical Development
1. The Original 1938 Version: Subjective Standard of Bad
Faith
Rule 11 was initially adopted in 1938 as part of the original
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 41 The original version of the
rule provided that by signing a pleading the attorney certified
that "to the best of his knowledge, information and belief there is
note (1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 587 (1993) ("The court has significant
discretion in determining what sanctions, if any, should be imposed for a
violation .... ").
37 See id. 11(c)(2); id. 11 advisory committee's note (1993), reprinted in 146
F.R.D. at 591-92 ("[A] monetary sanction imposed after a court-initiated show cause
order [must] be limited to a penalty payable to the court .... ").
38 See id. 11(c)(2)(B) (Monetary sanctions may not be awarded on the court's
initiative unless the court issues its order to show cause before a voluntary
dismissal or settlement of the claims .. "). The Advisory Committee explained that
"[p]arties settling a case should not be subsequently faced with an unexpected order
from the court leading to monetary sanctions that might have affected their
willingness to settle or voluntarily dismiss a case." Id. 11 advisory committee's note
(1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 592.
39 See Rebecca Ellen Bruck, Comment, Lessons in Eliminating Statutory
Vagueness: Rule 11 of the FRCP as a Model for Removing the "Good Faith" Fulcrum
from Section 707(A) of the Bankruptcy Code, 19 BANKR. DEV. J. 399, 414-15 (2003)
(using Rule 11 as a template of statutory clarity).
40 See Vairo, supra note 9, at 592 (underscoring the importance of historical
context for a proper understanding of Rule 11 and stating that "[t]o understand the
controversy about Rule 11 and the impact it has had on the legal profession, it is
important to remember the context in which the rule was first amended").
41 See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE xv-xvi
(2002) (providing a concise description of the process by which the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are promulgated and the roles of Congress, the Supreme Court, the
Judicial Conference, and the Advisory Committees in this process).
[Vol. 78:449
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good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for
delay. ' 42 The old rule provided for "appropriate disciplinary
action" against an attorney who violated the certification
provision, but sanctions were available only for "a willful
violation of [the] rule."43 The emphasis on the subjective nature
of the violation, however, was inconsistent with Rule l's
purpose "to check abuses in the signing of pleadings" 44 and "to
assure the integrity of pleadings." 45  First, the certification
standard was too forgiving-mere good faith would remove the
attorney's conduct from the reach of sanctions.46  Second,
because of the bad faith requirement, a significant burden of
proof had to be met before sanctions could be imposed.
47
Furthermore, the text of the rule failed to properly define the
key requirement that there be "good ground" to support the
pleading with the result that the nature of the duty owed by the
attorney to the court was unclear. 48 Due to these factors and a
general reluctance by courts to impose sanctions, 49 Rule 11
sanctions were rarely imposed.50 Thus, Rule 11, as originally
42 FED. R. CIv. P. 11 (1938).
43 Id.
44 Id. 11 advisory committee's note (1983), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 198
(1983).
45 See Cavanagh, supra note 18, at 503 ("Old Rule 11 was designed specifically
to assure the integrity of pleadings filed in federal court .. "). To underscore the
importance of the signature requirement in improving the integrity of litigation
process, Professor Cavanagh quoted Chief Justice Warren E. Burger: "Vhen the
elder statesmen among you here today came to the bar, I am sure you were told, as I
was, that your signature on a pleading or motion was something like your signature
on a check. There was supposed to be something to back it up." Id. at 503 n.23
(citing Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Serv., 596 F. Supp. 13, 27 (N.D. Ill. 1984) (quoting
Chief Justice Warren Burger, Address at American Law Institute Annual Meeting
(May 15, 1984))).
46 See id. at 504.
47 See id. at 505.
48 See id. at 504 (concluding that under the language of old Rule 11 "[t]he
precise nature of the attorney's responsibilities remained unclear").
49 See id. at 505, 505 n.41 (discussing the reluctance of judges to impose Rule
11 sanctions); Vairo, supra note 9, at 595 (commenting that "most judges were
notoriously reluctant to impose sanctions even when faced with apparently serious
breaches of professionalism").
50 See SAUL M. KASSIN, FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER, AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF
RULE 11 SANCTIONS 2 (1985) (reviewing the effectiveness of the 1938 version of Rule
11). From 1938 to 1976, Rule 11 produced only nineteen reported opinions in which
only three attorneys were actually sanctioned. Id. (citing Michael Risinger, Honesty
in Pleading and Its Enforcement: Some "Striking" Problems with Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 11, 61 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1976)). In the next three years there was
only one additional reported instance of Rule 11 sanctions. Id.
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
enacted, was an ineffective tool to combat the abuse of frivolous
filings. 51
2. The 1983 Amendments: Objective Standard of
Reasonableness
The major development in Rule 11 jurisprudence came in
1983, when the rule was significantly amended "[i]n an effort to
curtail frivolous claims, defenses, and motions more effectively,
to foster judicial economy, and to prevent delay in litigating
legitimate matters."52  As amended, Rule 11 established an
objective rather than a subjective standard for attorney's
conduct-by signing court documents, 53 the attorney certified
that her "knowledge, information, and belief' were "formed after
reasonable inquiry."54  Furthermore, the rule provided for
mandatory sanctions when the objective standard of
reasonableness was violated. 55
51 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983), reprinted in 97
F.R.D. 165, 198 (1983) ("Experience shows that in practice Rule 11 has not been
effective in deterring abuses."); Cavanagh, supra note 18, at 506 (concluding that
"the old Rule did not effectively deter abuses of the litigation process"); Vairo, supra
note 9, at 596 (pointing that before the 1983 amendments Rule 11 "was largely
ignored" and that certification provisions were "not read enough, not demanding
enough, and not honored enough"). "Promulgated to curb tendencies toward
untruthfulness, the effect of the rule was to place a moral obligation on attorneys to
satisfy themselves that good grounds existed for the action or defense." Id. at 595-96
(emphasis added).
52 Cavanagh, supra note 18, at 511. For an in depth discussion of the historical
context in which the 1983 amendments were promulgated and the reasons behind
the amendments see Vairo, supra note 9, at 591-98.
53 The 1983 amendments explicitly expanded the reach of Rule 11 to cover
"every pleading, motion, and other paper," as opposed to pleadings only in the
original version. FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 196 (1983).
Even prior to 1983, however, Rule 11 applied to motions and other papers through
incorporation by reference in Rule 7(b)(2). Id. 11 advisory committee's note (1983),
reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at 197.
54 The 1983 version of the rule provided in relevant part:
The signature of an attorney or party constitutes a certificate by him that
he has read the pleading, motion or other paper; that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is
well grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law or a good faith
argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law, and
that it is not interposed for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to
cause unnecessary delay or needless increase in the cost of litigation.
Id. 11, reprinted in 97 F.R.D. at 198 (emphasis added). Please note that in 1987
Rule 11 was amended to make the text gender neutral. See id. (1987).
55 Id. 11 (1983) ("If a pleading, motion, or other paper is signed in violation of
this rule, the court, upon motion or upon its own initiative, shall impose ... an
[Vol.78:449
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After the 1983 amendments, Rule 11 became the major
source of judicial sanctioning power in federal courts. 56 The
number of reported decisions imposing sanctions under Rule 11
increased dramatically after 1983.17 Along with an increase in
the sheer number of Rule 11 decisions, the 1983 amendments
produced "more controversy than perhaps any other Federal
Rule of Civil Proc'edure."58 Both proponents and critics of the
1983 version agreed that the rule had a positive effect in
deterring some litigation conduct because attorneys were
required to "stop and think" before filing papers. 59 Opponents of
the rule, however, maintained that much of the conduct being
deterred by the rule was the advancement of novel legal theories
and legitimate factual contentions by plaintiffs and their
attorneys, especially in civil rights actions.6 0
appropriate sanction." (emphasis added)).
56 See R. LAWRENCE DESSEM, PRETRIAL LITIGATION: LAW, POLICY AND
PRACTICE 149 (2d ed. 1996) ("While largely ignored for the first 45 years of its
existence, after its amendment in 1983 Rule 11 became a major concern both among
lawyers and judges."); GILLERS, supra note 3, at 493 ("Rule 11 is a force to be
reckoned with.").
57 See DESSEM, supra note 56, at 150, 150 n.75 (contrasting the number of
reported decisions before and after 1983). "As of 1988, only five years after amended
Rule 11 took effect, there were over 100 federal appellate decisions and over 1000
reported decisions in all federal courts dealing with Rule 11." Id. (citations omitted).
5s Vairo, supra note 9, at 591; see GILLERS, supra note 3, at 493-95 ("By far...
it is Rule 11 that has received the most attention, some of it highly critical, even
caustic.").
59 See DESSEM, supra note 56, at 150; Vairo, supra note 9, at 590 ("[T]here can
be no argument that Rule 11 has changed lawyer conduct in some significantly
positive ways .... [L]awyers engaged in more serious pre-filing research than
before, and... decided after such research not to file marginal pleading and
motions."); Erik Yamomoto & Danielle K. Hart, Rule 11 and State Courts: Panacea
or Pandora's Box?, 13 U. HAW. L. REV 57, 60-61 (1991) ("Rule 11 in federal courts
deters careless and ill-conceived filings to a measurable extent. Rule 11 has made
attorney's 'stop, look and inquire' before filing .... Fewer meritless positions are
asserted and litigated. Groundless motion and nuisance value claims are
discouraged." (citations omitted)).
60 Danielle Kie Hart, Still Chilling After All These Years: Rule 11 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure and Its Impact on Federal Civil Rights Plaintiffs After the
1993 Amendments, 37 VAL. U. L. REV. 1, 11 (2002) (discussing chilling effect of the
1983 version of the rule).
[B]ecause of the threat of Rule 11 sanctions, lawyers were much less likely
to file some novel but meritorious claims that they might otherwise have
pursued and/or to make novel legal arguments that may well have
prevailed in court .... Rule 11 had a disproportionate impact on certain
types of litigants and their attorneys; the threat of sanctions "pose[d]
special threats to small plaintiffs attorneys and to public interest and pro
bono attorneys, thereby inhibiting court access for certain social groups,
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The other major area of concern was the apparent overuse of
Rule 11.61 The relaxed objective standard, the mandatory nature
of sanctions upon a finding of unreasonable behavior, and the
allowance for the shifting of attorney fees triggered an
"avalanche of 'satellite litigation.' ",62 Designed to curtail the
abuses of the legal process, Rule 11 itself engendered abusive
practices 63 and raised the question of whether "the financial cost
in satellite litigation resulting from the imposition of sanctions
perhaps exceeded the benefits resulting from any increased
tendency of lawyers to 'stop and think.' "64
3. The 1993 Amendments: Step Back, Step Forward, No
Change in Applicable Standard
In response to the legitimate concerns raised by the critics of
the 1983 version of the rule,65 Rule 11 was again significantly
especially those asserting novel legal theories or reordered social
understandings in the form of legal rights."
Id. (quoting Yamomoto & Hart, supra note 59, at 101).
61 See Vairo, supra note 9, at 598.
62 Id. at 598.
63 See id. at 589-90.
Even though the adoption of amended Rule 11 in 1983 was in large
measure an attempt to deal with the abuses that undermined civility and
professionalism, it appears that Rule 11 contributed significantly to the
further decline in civility. This, in turn, may have contributed to further
undermining the public's confidence in the profession as well. The
availability of compensatory sanctions made possible by the amended rule
also created a new form of pernicious attorney conduct: the all-too-frequent
making of Rule 11 motions.
Id. at 590.
64 DESSEM, supra note 56, at 150 (quoting Committee on Rules of Practice and
Procedure, Judicial Conference of the United States, Call for Written Comments on
Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Related Rules, 131 F.R.D. 335,
346 (1990)).
65 See supra notes 60-64 and accompanying text. After reviewing Rule 11
criticism, the Advisory Committee concluded that:
[T]here was support for the following propositions: (1) Rule 11, in
conjunction with other rules, has tended to impact plaintiffs more
frequently and severely than defendants; (2) it occasionally has created
problems for a party which seeks to assert novel legal contentions or which
needs discovery from other persons to determine if the party's belief about
the facts can be supported with evidence; (3) it has too rarely been enforced
through nonmonetary sanctions, with cost-shifting having become the
normative sanction; (4) it provides little incentive, and perhaps a
disincentive, for a party to abandon positions after determining they are no
longer supportable in fact or law; and (5) it sometimes has produced
unfortunate conflicts between attorney and client, and exacerbated
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amended in 1993.66 While the apparent purpose of the 1993
amendments was to tone down 67 the far-reaching potency of Rule
11, it also appears that the Advisory Committee wanted to
ensure that Rule 11 would remain an effective and available tool
for the judicial enforcement of lawyers' conduct. 68
The changes implemented in 1993 were both substantive
and procedural in character. The substantive changes were
designed primarily to lessen the negative impact of Rule 11 "on
the assertion of novel claims and [the] disproportionate impact
on plaintiffs."69 First, the new version of the rule allowed for a
"nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification, or
reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law,"70 as
opposed to the "good faith" standard of the 1983 version.7 1
Second, the plaintiff now could assert not only factual
contentions that already had explicit evidentiary support, but
also those that were "likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery." 72
The other change designed to soften the impact of Rule 11 was
contentious behavior between counsel. In addition, although the great
majority of Rule 11 motions have not been granted, the time spent by
litigants and the courts in dealing with such motions has not been
insignificant.
Letter from Hon. Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee on Civil
Rules, to Hon. Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure (May 1, 1992), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 519, 523 (1993). The
purpose of the revision, as stated by the Advisory Committee, was "to remedy
problems that have arisen in the interpretation and application of the 1983 revision
of the rule." FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993), reprinted in 146
F.R.D. 401, 583 (1993).
66 See generally Theodore C. Hirt, A Second Look at Amended Rule 11, 48 AM.
U. L. REV. 1007, 1013-22 (1999) (providing a concise but thorough overview of the
1993 amendments).
67 See Vairo, supra note 9, at 589 (pointing out that "Rule 11 ultimately was
toned down in 1993").
68 See id. at 594 ('Though most of the changes were intended to scale back the
more draconian aspects of Rule 11, the mindset occasioned by the 1983 amendments
to Rule 11 remained."); infra note 86.
69 See Hart, supra note 60, at 25-26.
70 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2).
71 See Hart, supra note 60, at 25-26, 25 n.73 (discussing the effect of a
frivolousness standard on the assertion of novel claims).
72 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2). For a discussion of difficulties involved in
determining which assertions are likely to have evidentiary support before the
actual discovery, see Lisa Pondrom, Comment, Predicting the Unpredictable Under
Rule 11(B)(3): When are Allegations "Likely" to Have Evidentiary Support?, 43
UCLA L. REV. 1393, 1396-1402 (1996).
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the elimination of mandatory sanctions. 73 Now, even after a
determination that a violation occurred, courts had discretion
not to impose any sanctions. 74
While the substantive modifications were significant, the
Advisory Committee relied mainly on procedural changes to
combat the proliferation of secondary litigation brought by
lawyers seeking to use Rule 11 as a means of recovering legal
costs. 75  The procedural revisions included the previously-
described "safe harbor" provision 76 and the requirement that
litigants be given notice and an opportunity to respond before
the imposition of sanctions.7 7 Furthermore, courts imposing
sanctions were required to enter formal orders describing "the
conduct determined to constitute a violation ... and explain the
basis for the sanction imposed."78
Even as some of the changes introduced in 1993 were
designed to relax Rule 11 regime, 79 other modifications were
intended to actually broaden the reach of the rule.80 The more
subjective parts of the previous standard were replaced with
elements that were clearly objective.81 The 1983 version stated
that after reasonable inquiry the signer could conclude that
filings were "well grounded in fact and [were] warranted by
existing law or a good faith argument for the extension,
modification, or reversal of existing law."8 2 The 1993 revision
73 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c).
74 See id. ("If... the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated,
the court may... impose an appropriate sanction .... (emphasis added)); id. 11
advisory committee's note (1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 587 ("The court has
significant discretion in determining what sanctions, if any, should be imposed for a
violation." (emphasis added)).
75 See id. 11 advisory committee's note (1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 584
(stating that "greater constraints on the imposition of sanctions.., should reduce
the number of motions for sanctions presented to the court").
76 Id. 11(c)(1)(A) (providing that Rule 11 motion can be only filed with the court
twenty-one days after its service on the opponent and only if the opponent does not
withdraw the challenged document within that time); see supra note 32 and
accompanying text.
77 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c)(1)(B) (requiring the court to direct the offending party to
show cause why it has not violated the provisions of Rule 11 before any sanctions
could be imposed).
78 Id. 11(c)(3).
79 See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
80 See infra notes 81-88 and accompanying text.
Si See Hirt, supra note 66, at 1014 (discussing changes in Rule 11 standards of
liability).
82 FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983), reprinted in 97 F.R.D. 165, 167 (1983).
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replaced the "well grounded in fact" provision with the
requirement that the factual assertions either have "evidentiary
support" or "are likely to have evidentiary support after a
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery."8 3
The subjective "good faith" standard for advocating a
modification of existing law was replaced with the requirement
that such advocacy not be frivolous.8 4 While the effect of these
changes was arguably to reduce the disproportionate burden of
sanctions on plaintiffs and litigants attempting to advance novel
legal claims, 85 the Advisory Committee insisted that the purpose
of the revisions was to broaden and expand the responsibilities of
litigants to the court.8 6 The desire to broaden Rule l1's reach is
also evidenced by an expansion of the circle of persons and
entities potentially accountable for violation of the rule.8 7 As
amended, the rule allows sanctions to reach not only the persons
signing the meritless filing, but also those who were "responsible
for the violation."88
83 Id. 11(b)(3) (1993).
84 Id. 11(b)(2).
85 See supra notes 69-74 and accompanying text.
86 First, the Advisory Committee stated that the overall goal of Rule 11 was not
altered or reduced by the 1993 amendments: "The rule retains the principle that
attorneys and pro se litigants have an obligation to the court to refrain from conduct
that frustrates the aims of Rule 11. The revision broadens the scope of this
obligation .. " FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993), reprinted in
146 F.R.D. 401, 584 (1993) (emphasis added). The Committee reiterated the
requirement to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law and facts before filing:
These subdivisions restate the provisions requiring attorney and pro se
litigants to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the law and facts before
signing pleadings, written motions, and other documents, and prescribing
sanctions for violation of these obligations. The revision in part expands
the responsibilities of litigants to the court, while providing greater
constraints and flexibility in dealing with infractions of the rule. The rule
continues to require litigants to "stop-and-think" before initially making
legal or factual contentions.
Id., 146 F.D.R. at 584-85 (emphasis added).
87 See Hirt, supra note 66, at 1018-19 (discussing accountability for violation of
Rule 11).
88 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c). The list of those subject to Rule 11 sanctions, besides
the actual signer, now includes the violator's law firm, other attorneys in the firm,
co-counsel, other law firms, the represented party, and even governmental agencies
or other institutional parties that control the primary violator. See FED. R. Civ. P.
11 advisory committee's note (1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. at 589.
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II. IN RE PENNIE & EDMONDS: STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Factual and Procedural Background
The sanction issue decided in In re Pennie & Edmonds LLPs9
arose out of a trademark infringement dispute over the use of
the "Patsy's" brand in the marketing of pasta sauce.90  In
response to the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary injunction,
defendants asserted that they began using the "Patsy's" name in
1993, a year before the plaintiff started selling its product under
the same name. 91 In support of their contention, the defendants
submitted a label that purportedly was used in 1993 and a
printer's invoice showing that the label had been ordered in
1993.92 The submitted documents, however, were shown to be
false: the bar code type on the label and the phone number on
the invoice did not exist until some time after 1993. 93 After the
District Court granted the plaintiffs motion for a preliminary
injunction, the defendants' original counsel withdrew from the
case and the defendants retained the Pennie & Edmonds law
firm.94 Two partners of the firm questioned defendants about
the previously submitted documents. 95 One of the defendants,
Frank Brija, still maintained that the defendants had used the
disputed trademark prior to 1993 and explained the submission
of falsified documents was an inadvertent mistake. 96 According
to Brija, the disputed label was in fact used in 1993 but he
mistakenly submitted a 1999 version instead of the correct one. 97
With respect to the invoice, Brija explained that the printer had
been unable to locate the original and reconstructed a copy from
his recollection of printing orders.98 Brija produced an affidavit,
purportedly signed by the printer, stating that the invoice given
by the printer to Brija was a reconstruction and that the printer
did not recall disclosing to the defendants that he had given
89 323 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2003).
90 Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., 317 F.3d 209 (2d Cir. 2003).
91 Id. at 214.
92 Id.
93 Id.







them a reconstructed copy.99 While the defendants continued to
insist on the truthfulness of their explanations, the
circumstances afforded significant doubts about their claims. A
second label, claimed by the defendants to be the true 1993 label,
included a registration mark even though the defendants did not
own any registered trademarks for "Patsy's" in 1993.100
Furthermore, when the Pennie & Edmonds lawyers contacted
the printer's attorney, they were told that the printer denied
doing any business with the defendants during the relevant time
period and that he would so testify at the trial. 101
In opposition to the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment, the defendants submitted, among other papers, Brija's
affidavit, which reiterated his contention that the previous
fraudulent submission was an inadvertent mistake. 0 2  The
district court granted the plaintiffs motion for summary
judgment, explicitly rejecting Brija's explanation as false. 10 3 The
district judge John S. Martin also issued a sua sponte order
directing the Pennie & Edmonds lawyers to show cause why they
should not be sanctioned under Rule 11 for permitting their
client to submit a false affidavit. 10 4 Since it was not possible to
withdraw the paper at this point, the law firm responded by
detailing the steps taken to investigate the client's explanations
and also pointed out the defendants' repeated insistence on the
truthfulness of their statements. 10 5 Although Judge Martin
accepted the firm's assertion that it had acted in subjective good
faith,10 6 he sanctioned Pennie & Edmonds for permitting the
filing of "an affidavit containing statements that the law firm
could not have objectively believed were true."'0 7 The firm was
ordered to send to every attorney in the firm a copy of the court's
opinion imposing sanctions accompanied by a memorandum
stating that it was the policy of the firm to adhere to the "highest
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consequences even if such adherence caused the loss of a
client. 108
Despite the relatively mild nature of the sanctions, Pennie &
Edmonds appealed Judge Martin's decision. 10 9  The firm
contended that court-initiated sanctions were improper because
the firm's lawyers had not acted in bad faith.110 The Second
Circuit agreed with the firm and held that where "a sua sponte
Rule 11 sanction denies a lawyer the opportunity to withdraw
the challenged document pursuant to the 'safe harbor' provision
of Rule 11(c)(1)(A), the appropriate standard is subjective bad
faith." '11 Because the district court made an explicit finding that
the Pennie & Edmonds' lawyers acted with subjective good faith,
the court of appeals vacated the order imposing a Rule 11
sanction. 112
B. The Majority Opinion
The Second Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Jon 0.
Newman and joined by the late Judge Fred I. Parker, analyzed
the impact of the 1993 amendments to Rule 11 and concluded
that the intended effect of those amendments was to restore the
pre-1983 standard of subjective bad faith for post-trial, sua
sponte Rule 11 sanctions. 1 3 The linchpin to the court's analysis
was the "safe harbor" provision and its effect on Rule 11
sanctions. 114 Judge Newman contrasted the availability of the
"safe harbor" for sanctions initiated by a motion with the
108 Id.
109 Id. The decision to appeal is certainly understandable. There are arguably
no sanctions against attorneys that are "too mild." See GILLERS, supra note 3, at
495.
Rule 11 and related sanctions alarm lawyers for several reasons. For
most, having a judge find that they engaged in frivolous or vexatious
conduct, no matter how modest the sanction, is disturbing. The court's
opinion may appear in the case reports, on line, or in the popular or legal
press. Client relations may suffer if sanctions are jointly imposed on the
lawyer and client, if the sanction undermines the client's cause, or if it
requires additional legal expense beyond the sanction itself.
Id.
110 In re Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 87.
111 Id.
112 Id. at 93.
113 Id. at 91 n.4 ("We believe we implement the [Advisory] Committee's
expectation by applying a contempt-like mens rea standard to court-initiated show
cause orders issued where there is no opportunity to withdraw or correct.").
114 Id. at 89.
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absence of similar protections when the sanctions are initiated
by a court. 115 Rationalizing this discrepancy, the court examined
the Advisory Committee's Note to the 1993 amendments. 116 The
Advisory Committee explained the absence of a "safe harbor"
protection against sua sponte sanctions as follows: "Since show
cause orders will ordinarily be issued only in situations that are
akin to a contempt of court, the rule does not provide a 'safe
harbor' to a litigant for withdrawing a claim, defense, etc., after
a show cause order has been issued on the court's own
initiative." 7 The Second Circuit interpreted the phrase "akin to
a contempt of court" as imposing the same mens rea standard for
Rule 11 violations as for contempt of court." 8 After noting that
contempt sanctions require a finding of bad faith, 19 the court
concluded that sua sponte Rule 11 sanctions are subject to the
same requirement. 20
The court also concluded that a heightened mens rea
requirement better serves a "vigorous adversary process."'12 1 The
court considered the risk "that lawyers will sometimes withhold
submissions that they honestly believe have plausible
evidentiary support for fear that a trial judge, perhaps at the
conclusion of a contentious trial, will erroneously consider a
115 Id.
116 Id. at 89-90.
117 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D.
401, 592 (1993).
118 In re Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 90.
119 Id. (citing Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Andy Warhol, 194 F.3d 323,
338 (2d Cir. 1999); Sakon v. Andreo, 119 F.3d 109, 114 (2d Cir. 1997)).
120 Id. (finding "strong support for the proposition that, when applying
sanctions under Rule 11 for conduct that is 'akin to a contempt of court,' a bad faith
standard should apply"). According to the majority, the authors of the 1993
amendments intended such an interpretation:
We have taken seriously the Committee's expectation that show cause
orders will be issued in circumstances where the challenged conduct is
"akin to contempt," which, as we have noted, requires bad faith.... By
declining to make the "safe harbor" provision applicable to court-initiated
show cause orders, the Committee was signaling that the unavailability of
an opportunity to withdraw or correct makes the sanction appropriate for
conduct "akin to contempt," conduct that traditionally requires a
heightened mens rea standard. We believe we implement the Committee's
expectation by applying a contempt-like mens rea standard to court-
initiated show cause orders issued where there is no opportunity to
withdraw or correct.
Id. at 91 n.4.
121 Id. at 91.
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litigant's claimed belief to be objectively unreasonable."' 122 The
majority acknowledged the risk that on some occasions a jury
may give "unwarranted weight" to objectively unreasonable
submissions. 123  The court, nevertheless, concluded that the
interests of the adversary system require presenting
questionable evidence to a jury, and that a heightened mens rea
better satisfies that requirement in the context of Rule 11
sanctions. 124
The Pennie court explicitly limited its holding to situations
where, as in the instant case, the court initiates Rule 11
proceedings post-trial and counsel has no opportunity to correct
or withdraw the challenged submission. 125  The majority
admitted that the bad faith standard arguably should apply to
all court-initiated Rule 11 sanctions. The court agreed that the
"akin to contempt" language in the Advisory Committee's note
applies to all sua sponte sanctions, and that the "safe harbor"
protection against such sanctions is unavailable regardless of
when the show cause order is issued. 126 Nevertheless, the court
refused to make "so broad a ruling" and declined to reach the
question of whether all Rule 11 sua-sponte sanctions are subject
to a subjective standard. 127
122 Id.
123 Id.
124 See id. The court explained that:
A vigorous adversary process is better served by avoiding the inhibiting
effect of an "objectively unreasonable" standard applied to unchallenged
submissions, and letting questionable evidence be tested with cross-
examination and opposing evidence than by encouraging lawyers to
withhold such evidence. It is better to apply a heightened mens rea
standard to unchallenged submissions and take the slight risk with respect
to such submissions that, on occasion, a jury will give unwarranted weight
to a few submissions that a judge would consider objectively unreasonable
than to withhold from the jury many submissions that are objectively
reasonable but that cautious lawyers dare not present.
Id.
125 Id. at 91-92.
126 Id. at 91.
127 Id. at 91-92 ("We need not decide the standard for a sanction proceeding
initiated earlier in the litigation at a time when the challenged submission could be





Judge Stefan R. Underhill' 28 filed a dissenting opinion. He
criticized the majority for "substitut[ing] its judgment for that of
the Advisory Committee. '129 He argued that the majority erred
in reverting to a heightened "bad faith" state-of-mind
requirement for a subset of Rule 11 proceedings. Judge
Underhill reasoned that this was a "requirement that the
Advisory Committee, the Supreme Court and Congress
abandoned in 1983."130
Judge Underhill, applying a plain meaning analysis, argued
that the substantive nature of the sanctionable conduct for both
on-motion and sua sponte sanctions should be the same. He
argued that the mere procedural distinctions in the text of Rule
11 were not enough to justify different treatment.13' He then
turned to an analysis of whether the Advisory Committee
intended to make such a distinction and concluded that it did
not.1 32 The dissent faulted the majority for "a misreading of the
Advisory Committee's intent" because it had relied on the phrase
"akin to contempt" which came from a single sentence in the
Advisory Committee notes.' 33 Judge Underhill maintained that
the "akin to contempt" language merely described conduct that is
subject to a show cause order and not the actor's state of mind. 34
128 Judge Underhill, of the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut, was sitting on the Second Circuit by designation. It is probably
appropriate to suggest that, as a trial judge, Judge Underhill is familiar with the
behavior of lawyers during litigation and values every tool available to the judge to
control the flow of the trial and the conduct of the trial's participants. See Zak v.
Kenney, 197 F.R.D. 212, 212 (D. Conn. 2000) (imposing sua sponte Rule 11
monetary sanction of $250 on defendant's counsel for failing to keep the court
informed of material matters, failing to comply with court orders, and causing
significant delay in the trial date).
129 In re Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 101 (Underhill, J., dissenting).
130 Id. at 102.
131 Id. at 94 ("The fundamental flaw in the majority's interpretation of Rule 11
is that it seeks to use procedural distinctions . . . regarding how sanctions can be
imposed with and without a motion, to modify the substantive
requirements ... which control[] whether a violation of Rule 11 has occurred.").
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id. at 95 ("[T]he Show Cause Sentence is predictive, not restrictive; the
reference to contempt describes the seriousness of the conduct likely to prompt a
court to issue a show cause order initiating sanctions proceeding, not the mens rea
necessary before sua sponte sanctions can permissibly be imposed.").
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The dissent also dismissed the majority's assertion that
"changing the mens rea standard for a class of court-initiated
Rule 11 sanctions is supported by policy considerations.' 135
While not directly challenging the policy analysis advanced by
the majority, Judge Underhill maintained that it was improper
for the court to impose its own solution to the perceived problem
when a legislative "considered judgment" reflects "efforts to
balance competing interests, concerns and suggestions. '136
Concluding that the imposition of a bad faith standard as a
prerequisite for Rule 11 sanctions "[was] not supported by the
text, Advisory Committee notes, drafting history or purpose of
Rule 11" and that the proper standard should still be a
reasonableness test, the dissent would have affirmed the
sanction imposed on Pennie & Edmonds. 137
III. IN RE PENNIE & EDMONDS: ANALYSIS
A. Rule 11's Weak Support for a Separate Standard for Sua
Sponte Sanctions
The differential treatment the authors of the 1993
amendments gave to on-motion and court-initiated sanctions is
the foundation of the Second Circuit's decision in In re Pennie &
Edmonds to impose a separate standard for sua sponte
sanctions. 138 The text of Rule 11 separates the sanctions based
on the method of their initiation-the procedural steps required
for on-motion sanctions are described in section (c)(1)(A) of the
rule, 139 and those for court-initiated proceedings are in section
135 Id. at 101.
136 Id.
137 Id. at 102.
138 See id. at 89-90 (exploring the differences between on-motion and court-
initiated sanctions).
139 FED. R. CIv. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
A motion for sanctions under this rule shall be made separately from other
motions or requests and shall describe the specific conduct alleged to
violate subdivision (b). It shall be served as provided in Rule 5, but shall
not be filed with or presented to the court unless, within 21 days after
service of the motion (or such other period as the court may prescribe), the
challenged paper, claim, defense, contention, allegation, or denial is not
withdrawn or appropriately corrected. If warranted, the court may award
to the party prevailing on the motion the reasonable expenses and
attorney's fees incurred in presenting or opposing the motion. Absent
exceptional circumstances, a law firm shall be held jointly responsible for
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(c)(1)(B). 14° However, such separate treatment in the structural
language of the rule, standing alone, does not support the mens
rea distinction-section (c) merely sets out the procedural steps
that must be taken before the court may reach the question of
whether the substantive requirement of the certification
provision was violated.141  This substantive requirement is
defined in section (b), which does not differentiate between types
of sanction proceedings and, therefore, does not afford any
deviation from a single mens rea standard. 142
In the absence of any meaningful textual distinctions
between the two types of Rule 11 sanctions (on-motion and sua
sponte) as related to the applicable standard,1 43 the Pennie court
had to base its conclusion on the practical differences afforded by
the "safe harbor" to lawyers facing on-motion sanctions. 144 There
is, of course, a profound difference between facing a sanction
motion from an adversary and responding to a show cause order.
In the former case, the attorney remains in control of the
determination of whether to withdraw the disputed submission
or to challenge the potential Rule 11 motion. Withdrawal within
twenty-one days will automatically thwart any sanctions.145 In
the case of a court's show cause order, corrective actions by the
violations committed by its partners, associates, and employees.
Id.
140 Id. li(c)(1)(B) ("On its own initiative, the court may enter an order
describing the specific conduct that appears to violate subdivision (b) and directing
an attorney, law firm, or party to show cause why it has not violated subdivision (b)
with respect thereto.").
141 See id. 11(c)(1); see also In re Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 94 (Underhill,
J., dissenting) ("Under a plain reading of Rule 11, the procedural distinctions set
forth in section (c) have no bearing whatsoever on the state-of-mind requirement of
section (b).").
142 See supra note 28 (full text of Rule 11 (b)).
143 As the Pennie dissent pointed out, "The majority [did] not cite to any
language in the rule itself that marks a distinction in the state-of-mind required for
imposition of sanctions with and without a motion by counsel, because no such
language exists." In re Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 94 (Underhill, J.,
dissenting).
144 See id. at 89.
145 See Hadges v. Yonkers Racing Corp., 48 F.3d 1320, 1328 (2d Cir. 1995)
(stating that sanctions are not allowed when plaintiff would have withdrawn or
corrected misstatements if he had the proper twenty-one day notice); Tri-Tech
Mach. Sales, Ltd. v. Artos Eng'g Co., 928 F. Supp. 836, 840 (E.D. Wis. 1996) (holding
that a correction of pleadings within the safe harbor will be protected from
sanctions); see also 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 17, 11.22[1][b] (describing
operation of Rule 1 il's "safe harbor" provisions).
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attorney, while relevant, 146 do not guarantee that sanctions
cannot be imposed. 147
It appears, however, that neither the practical and
procedural differences between on-motion and sua sponte
sanctions 148 nor the Advisory Committee's cursory reference to
contempt warrant the Second Circuit's conclusion that the
drafters' intent was to impose a separate mens rea for sua sponte
sanctions. The textual construction of the Advisory Committee's
Note does not conclusively support the proposition that sua
sponte sanctions are essentially the same as contempt of court
sanctions and, therefore, must have the same state-of-mind
requirement. First, the "akin to contempt" language does not
literally mean "the same as contempt."149 Second, the Advisory
Committee's Note states that sua sponte Rule 11 sanctions "will
ordinarily be issued only in situations that are akin to a
contempt,"1 50 leaving open the possibility that sanctions can be
imposed in situations that are less egregious than the conduct
usually associated with contempt sanctions. 151
Furthermore, sua sponte Rule 11 sanctions and contempt of
court sanctions should not be treated the same in every respect
(including the required mens rea) because each of these sanctions
has a distinct purpose behind it.152 The purpose of contempt
146 "Such corrective action ... should be taken into account in deciding what-if
any-sanction to impose if, after consideration of the litigant's response, the court
concludes that a violation has occurred." FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's
note (1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 592 (1993).
147 See Ridder v. City of Springfield, 109 F.3d 288, 297 n.8 (6th Cir. 1997)
(stating that "safe harbor" is not available for court-initiated sanctions); FED. R.
Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 592 (1993)
("[T]he rule does not provide a 'safe harbor' to a litigant for withdrawing a claim,
defense, etc., after a show cause order has been issued on the court's own
initiative.").
148 See supra notes 139-47 and accompanying text (discussing textual and
practical differences between two types of Rule 11 sanction proceedings).
149 Webster's Dictionary defines "akin" as "similar, analogous, comparable,
parallel." RANDOM HOUSE WEBSTER'S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 46 (2d ed. 1997).
150 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D.
401, 592 (1993) (emphasis added).
151 The Pennie majority brushed this possibility aside by explaining the use of
the word "ordinarily" as "a natural reluctance of rule-makers to say 'always,' in
candid recognition of their inability to anticipate every imaginable set of
circumstances that might one day arise." In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86,
92 (2d Cir. 2003).
152 See Willy v. Coastal Corp., 503 U.S. 131, 138-39 (1992) ("A civil contempt
order has much different purposes than a Rule 11 sanction.").
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sanctions is either punitive-to vindicate the authority of the
court, 153 or remedial-to force a party to comply with a court
order or to compensate the complainant.154  The punitive,
coercive, or compensatory functions of contempt sanctions focus
on the past or future conduct of a particular contemnor. 155 The
requirement that a finding of subjective bad faith supports a
contempt order 15 6 is consistent with such "individualized"
operation of contempt sanctions. In contrast, the goal of Rule 11
sanctions is not only "to punish a party who has already violated
the court's rules,"' 57 but also to prevent the repetition of such
violations by the same violator and by others, both in the context
of the current case and in future proceedings. 58 The deterrent
goal of Rule 11 is better served by requiring the participants to
153 See Int'l Union, United Mine Workers v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 828 (1994)
(describing both punitive and coercive roles of criminal contempt).
"[W]hen a court imposes fines and punishments on a contemnor, it is not
only vindicating its legal authority to enter the initial court order, but it
also is seeking to give effect to the law's purpose of modifying the
contemnor's behavior to conform to the terms required in the order." Most
contempt sanctions, like most criminal punishments, to some extent
punish a prior offense as well as coerce an offender's future obedience.
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 635 (1988)).
154 See id. at 829 (describing the remedial purpose of civil contempt sanctions
and explaining that a "contempt fine accordingly is considered civil and remedial if
it either 'coerce[s] the defendant into compliance with the court's order, [or] ...
compensate[s] the complainant for losses sustained'" (alteration in original)
(quoting United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 303-04 (1947)));
Willy, 503 U.S. at 139 ("Civil contempt is designed to force the contemnor to comply
with an order of the court ... to coerce compliance with the court's decree .... ).
155 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D.
401, 587-89 (1993).
156 See Schlaifer Nance & Co. v. Estate of Andy Warhol, 194 F.3d 323, 338 (2d
Cir. 1999) (reiterating the requirement of a specific finding of bad faith for sanctions
under court's inherent power doctrine and under 28 U.S.C § 1927); United States v.
Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 948 F.2d 1338, 1345 (2d Cir. 1991) (same).
157 Willy, 503 U.S. at 139.
158 The Advisory Committee explicitly stated that "the purpose of Rule 11 is to
deter [frivolous filings]." FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993),
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 587 (1993). Rule l's goal of altering the behavior of
litigants in more general ways than in the context of a particular controversy is also
evidenced by the definition of the nature of sanctions. "A sanction imposed for
violation of this rule shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such
conduct or comparable conduct by others similarly situated." Id. 11(c)(2) (emphasis
added). One of the factors to be considered in determining what sanctions are
appropriate is the amount "needed to deter similar activity by other litigants." Id. 11
advisory committee's note (1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 587 (1993) (emphasis
added).
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adhere to an objective reasonableness standard, rather than the
subjective bad faith standard. 159
The general historical development of Rule 11160 and the
legislative history of the 1993 amendments 161 also reveal no
intent to revert to a subjective test for evaluating attorney
behavior. The changes implemented in 1993 were designed to
address the specific set of problems that had "arisen in the
interpretation and application of the 1983 revision of the rule."'162
In particular, the "safe harbor" provisions were introduced not to
protect attorneys from sanctions 163 but to "reduce the number of
motions for sanctions presented to the court"'164 and to provide an
incentive "to abandon a questionable contention."'165 The overall
goal was to "protect the courts from the burden of deciding
numerous, often unnecessary, Rule 11 motions.1 66 Since the
"safe harbor" was introduced to combat issues other than the
perceived harshness of the reasonableness standard, 67 one
cannot read into the rule the desire to protect litigants and their
attorneys. It is logical to conclude, as the Pennie dissent did,
159 See Vairo, supra note 9, at 607 ("Rule 11 was designed to alter behavior.
The point of the rule is to impose an affirmative duty on attorneys.... [It may be
appropriate to sanction an attorney ... where the attorney lacked the knowledge or
belief that would have come from a reasonable inquiry.").
160 See supra Part I.B. (providing a brief overview of Rule 11 history).
161 In re Pennie & Edmonds provides an analysis of the legislative history of
Rule 11 as it relates to the standard for sanctions. See In re Pennie & Edmonds
LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 99-101 (2d Cir. 2003) (Underhill, J., dissenting).
162 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D.
401, 583 (1993). The problems that the 1993 amendments sought to remedy
included the disproportionate impact of sanctions on plaintiffs, the negative effect
on assertions of novel or unpopular claims, the implosion of motions seeking cost-
shifting, the lack of incentives to abandon no longer supportable positions, the
exacerbation of unprofessional and uncivil behavior, and the time burden on the
courts. See supra note 65.
163 The elimination of the requirement for mandatory sanctions upon finding a
violation of the rule addressed the need to protect the attorneys from pointless
sanctions. See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
164 FED. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D.
401, 584 (1993).
165 Id.
166 In re Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 100 (Underhill, J., dissenting)
(emphasis in original).
167 In addition to the concerns about Rule 11 overuse that were addressed by
the introduction of the "safe harbor," the "chilling effect" of the rule was considered
by the authors of the 1993 amendments and addressed elsewhere in the rule
without changing the applicable standard of conduct. See supra notes 69-72 and
accompanying text.
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"that courts do not need to be protected from matters that they
raise on their own" 168 and, therefore, a "safe harbor" is not
needed for court-initiated sanctions.
Other procedural changes in the rule address the particular
concerns that may be raised by sua sponte sanctions. Courts are
required to issue a show cause order and provide notice and an
opportunity to respond before sanctions may be leveled. 169 Cost-
shifting orders are prohibited in the sua sponte context 170 and
other monetary sanctions are not allowed unless the court issues
a show cause order before any voluntary dismissal or
settlement.171
The writers of the 1993 amendments carefully attempted to
remedy the problems associated with the then current version of
Rule 11. They did not want to alter the main proposition of the
1983 version-that there is "an affirmative duty to conduct a
reasonable inquiry into the facts and the law before filing. 172
Each issue addressed in 1993 was resolved without reverting to
the pre-1983 bad faith standard.1 73 Furthermore, the Advisory
Committee explicitly reiterated that the intended effect of the
changes was to broaden, not to narrow, the scope of the duty
owed by litigants and attorneys to the court.174 It is highly
unlikely that an issue as important as a change in an applicable
standard for a sizeable subset of Rule 11 sanctions would be
addressed only in passing in one of the Advisory Committee's
notes and not in the text of the rule itself.175 Moreover, the
168 In re Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 100 (Underhill, J., dissenting).
169 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(B). The Advisory Committee explained that "[t]he
power of the court to act on its own initiative [was] retained, but with the condition
that this be done through a show cause order. This procedure provides the person
with notice and an opportunity to respond." Id. 11 advisory committee's note (1993),
reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 591 (1993).
170 See id. 11(c)(2); supra note 37 and accompanying text. But see Hart, supra
notes 60, at 70-72 (showing that some courts award attorney's fees under Rule 11
sua sponte despite the prohibition).
171 See supra note 38.
172 Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 551
(1991).
173 See supra notes 69-78 and accompanying text.
174 See supra note 86.
175 Despite the importance usually afforded to the Advisory Committee's notes
in the interpretation of the rules, the notes themselves are not the law. See
STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE xvi, (2001) (explaining
that the Advisory Committee's notes "do not have the force of law" but "often serve
the same function for the Rules that legislative history does for statutes").
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proposal to provide "safe harbor" protection for court-initiated
sanctions was considered and rejected.176  This rejection,
together with the failure to provide explicitly for a subjective
standard for sanctions, quite convincingly shows that the
Advisory Committee thought that any additional protections for
lawyers were unnecessary or inappropriate.
B. Policy Considerations
It appears that the Pennie majority was aware that, in
interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, federal courts
are not allowed to apply their "own notions of public policy."' 77
The majority insisted that its public policy analysis merely
demonstrated the "soundness" of the Advisory Committee's
decision to implement the subjective bad faith standard for
court-initiated sanctions. 178  Regardless of whether policy
176 See In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 92 n.5. (2d Cir. 2003).
Several groups have suggested that the safe harbor provisions, which
under the published draft apply only to motions filed by other litigants,
should apply also to show cause orders issued at the court's own initiative.
The Advisory Committee continues to believe that court-initiated show
cause orders-which typically relate to matters that are akin to contempt
of court-are properly treated somewhat differently from party-initiated
motions.
Id. (quoting Letter from Hon. Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman, Advisory Committee
on Civil Rules, to Hon. Robert E. Keeton, Chairman, Standing Committee on Rules
of Practice and Procedure (May 1, 1992), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 525 (1993)).
177 In re Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 91 n.4 ('We believe we implement the
Committee's expectation by applying a contempt-like mens rea standard to court-
initiated show cause orders issued where there is no opportunity to withdraw or
correct."). The principle that the judgment of the Advisory Committee is controlling
was clearly articulated by the Supreme Court in Business Guides:
[T]his Court is not acting on a clean slate; our task is not to decide what
the rule should be, but rather to determine what it is.... Even if we were
convinced that a subjective bad faith standard would more effectively
promote the goals of Rule 11, we would not be free to implement this
standard outside of the rulemaking process. "Our task is to apply the text,
not to improve upon it."
Business Guides, 498 U.S. at 548-49 (quoting Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entm't
Group, 493 U.S. 120, 126 (1989)).
178 See In re Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 92 n.4.
In reaching our conclusion, we have not.., applied our own notions of
public policy. Rather, we have discussed the policy implications of our
ruling and the adverse implications of a contrary ruling only to indicate
the soundness of the Advisory Committee's expectation that show cause
orders issued without an opportunity to withdraw or correct a challenged
submission will be used in circumstances akin to contempt.
Id. at 91-92 n.4.
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considerations were advanced by the court to illustrate the
propriety of the Advisory Committee's expectation or the Second
Circuit's own view of the matter, the court's analysis and
conclusion are questionable.
The premise for the policy analysis of Rule 11 sanctions is a
search for a proper balance between a lawyer's ability to submit
all legitimate claims on behalf of clients and the courts' interest
in maintaining the functionality and integrity of the legal
system. 179 The Pennie majority believed that the court's power to
impose sanctions for unreasonable submissions when offenders
do not have the opportunity to correct them shifts the balance to
such an extent that it can do "more damage to the robust
functioning of the adversary process than the benefit it would
achieve.' 80 However, what appears to be a careful balancing of
the risks associated with court-initiated sanctions proceedings is,
upon close examination, the Second Circuit's own value
judgment. The court simply assumed that there is a substantial
risk that legitimate submissions will be withheld out of the fear
of sanctions and that the risk of improper submissions is only
"slight."''1  While it is inherently difficult to estimate the
number of otherwise valid submissions that may never have
been filed because of the possibility of sanctions, 8 2 there is some
179 The Pennie court quite logically observed that:
If the sanction regime is too severe, lawyers will sometimes be deterred
from making legitimate submissions on behalf of clients out of
apprehension that their conduct will erroneously be deemed improper. On
the other hand, if the sanction regime is too lenient, lawyers will
sometimes be emboldened to make improper submissions on behalf of
clients, confident that their misconduct will either be undetected or dealt
with too leniently to matter.
Id. at 90-91.
180 Id. at 93.
181 See id. at 91, 93.
It is better to apply a heightened mens rea standard to unchallenged
submissions and take the slight risk with respect to such submissions that,
on occasion, a jury will give unwarranted weight to a few submissions that
a judge would consider objectively unreasonable than to withhold from the
jury many submissions that are objectively reasonable but that cautious
lawyers dare not present.
Id. at 91 (emphasis added).
182 The commentators often rely on anecdotal evidence to ascertain the impact
of Rule 11 on litigants. See, e.g., Hart, supra note 60, at 106 (admitting that any
conclusions reached in evaluating the chilling effect of the rule are "anecdotal");
Hirt, supra note 66, at 1026 ("To date [(as of 1999)], there is relatively little
academic or practitioner commentary on how the amended Rule operates. There is,
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data showing that Rule 11 still has a chilling effect, especially in
civil rights cases.18 3 It is unclear, however, what portion of those
"chilled claims" can be attributed to a fear of sua sponte
sanctions, or to a fear of sanctions in general. It might be true
that a court-initiated proceeding is more likely to result in the
imposition of an actual sanction than the process started by a
motion.18 4 Nonetheless, the higher risk that a show cause order
will result in a sanction is counter-balanced by the fact that sua
sponte show cause orders make up a relatively small share of all
Rule 11 sanction proceedings.18 5 Statistically, an attorney is
more likely to be sanctioned pursuant to a motion by her
opponent than as a result of a court-initiated proceeding.186
however, some 'anecdotal' reporting .. " (citation omitted)).
183 See Hart, supra note 60, at 143 (analyzing the federal case law and
concluding that "because of the way the 1993 amendments are being interpreted
and applied in the federal courts, the chilling effects continue to exist today").
184 Id. at 92-93 (finding that the rate of sanctions actually imposed pursuant to
orders to show cause was as high as 71%); see also Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The
Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 943, 952 (1992) (analyzing the impact
of the 1983 version of the rule and concluding that "the rate of sanctions emerging
from a judicial show cause order is far greater than the success rate of motions for
sanctions: about 60% of the judicially-initiated Rule 11 formal activity leads to
sanctions as compared with approximately 15% of the counsel-initiated motions").
185 See Hart, supra note 60, at 92-93 (estimating that district court issued show
cause orders in 16% of all reviewed Rule 11 sanctions cases); Hirt, supra note 66, at
1035-36 (concluding that court-initiated sanctions "represent a small number of
decisions relative to the number of decisions in which courts have considered
motions filed by a party"). The earlier study also suggests that the risk that a party
will be sanctioned as a result of the court-initiated proceeding is actually smaller
than the risk of a successful motion by an adversary. See Marshall et al., supra note
184, at 952. The overall rate of success for all Rule 11 sanction proceedings was
reported at 17% as compared to 15% success rate of the counsel-initiated motions.
Id. Thus, all sua sponte sanctions only increased the overall rate by 2%, despite the
fact that court-initiated proceedings were four times more likely to result in
sanctions. See id. Of course, the reliability of this study's results should be
discounted in determining the current risks because the impact of the "safe harbor"
was not taken into consideration.
186 See Hart, supra note 60, at 92-93. Out of one hundred thirty-five federal
cases collected and analyzed by Professor Hart, Rule 11 sanctions were imposed in
sixty-six cases. Id. at 103. Orders to show cause were issued in twenty-one of those
cases and resulted in fifteen sanctions, comprising approximately 23% of the sixty-
six Rule 11 cases. Id. at 92-93. Conversely, fifty-one sanctions, or 77%, were
imposed pursuant to counsel-initiated proceedings. See id. While Professor Hart's
research admittedly falls short of the comprehensive across-the-board statistical
analysis of Rule 11, it nevertheless suggests that even with the availability of the
"safe harbor" provisions it is still three times more likely that an actual sanction




Assessment of the magnitude of risk that attorneys will face
sanctions pursuant to the court's order to show cause is only one
part of the analysis of whether such sanctions curtail legitimate
claims. The other part is a determination of whether the
apprehension of such risk by lawyers will actually alter their
decisions to file submissions that they themselves believe to be
"borderline." The Pennie court, in reaching its conclusion that
there will be "many submissions that are objectively reasonable
but that cautious lawyers dare not present,"18 7 failed to consider
the factors that provide strong incentives for an attorney to file a
paper regardless of the attorney's beliefs about the merits of the
filing or the adequacy of pre-filing research. These incentives
may arise from ethical188 and legal18 9 obligations to clients and,
very often, from underlying economic realities of the attorney-
client relationship in the context of an adversary system. 190 The
common theme of these incentives is their strong presence at the
time when filing of the motion is contemplated, as opposed to the
threat of Rule 11 sanctions, which at this moment may be seen
by an attorney as fairly remote. Without a real threat of
sanctions that are not automatically preventable by a filer's
subsequent actions, there will be no real counterweight to the
inclination to file first and consider the merits of a motion
later. 191
187 In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2003).
188 There is an independent duty to zealously represent a client. This duty may,
in some situations, require an attorney who honestly believes in the legal merits of
her client's contentions to present them to the court. See supra note 3; see also
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble (2003) ("As advocate, a lawyer
zealously asserts the client's position under the rules of the adversary system.");
N.Y.S.B.A., Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility EC 7-3, available at
http://www.nysba.org/ContentlNavigationMenuIAttorney-Resources/
LawyersCode ofProfessionalResponsibilityfLawyersCodeOfProfessionalResponsi
bility.pdf (last revised Jan. 1, 2002) ("While serving as advocate, a lawyer should
resolve in favor of the client doubts as to the bounds of the law.").
189 See GILLERS, supra note 3, at 765-68 (discussing lawyers' liability to clients
for malpractice and breach of fiduciary duty).
190 See id. at 143-46 (discussing various financial arrangements for paying for
legal services and noting that "[m]ost lawyers get paid by their clients"); Yablon,
supra note 5, at 69-76 (analyzing the economic rationale behind frivolous cases and
describing situations "in which it pays for lawyers to bring cases they know they are
going to lose").
191 See Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688, 692 (5th Cir. 1986). The court in Hale
pronounced, possibly prematurely in light of the Pennie case, that:
The day is past when our notice pleading practice--circumscribed only by a
requirement of subjective good faith on the pleader's part-plus liberal
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C. Likely Effect of In re Pennie & Edmonds on the Rule 11
Sanctions Regime
The consequences of the Second Circuit decision in In re
Pennie & Edmonds can be analyzed under two possible
scenarios. First, one can assume that the subjective bad faith
standard will apply only to post-trial situations when there is
absolutely no opportunity for any corrective measures to be
taken. The Pennie holding is explicitly limited to such post-trial
situations. 192 The second possible scenario is that the bad faith
standard will apply to all sua sponte Rule 11 sanctions. While
the court refused to adopt the second approach, 193 the rationale
behind the holding certainly supports its extension to
proceedings initiated earlier in the litigation.194
discovery rules invited the federal practitioner to file suit first and find out
later whether he had a case or not. We have observed that, before 1983,
Rule 11 required merely a subjective, good faith belief that there was good
ground to support a pleading. In such circumstances, unless the pleading
was preposterous on its face, the less the pleader inquired, the safer he
was from sanction.
Id. (citation omitted).
192 See In re Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 87. The framing of the issue and
the court's explicit holding leave no doubt that the court intended to limit the bad
faith standard only to post-trial Rule 11 proceedings:
The specific issue is whether the lawyer's liability for the sanction requires
a mental state of bad faith or only objective unreasonableness in
circumstances where the lawyer has no opportunity to withdraw or correct
the challenged submission.... We conclude that where, as here, a sua
sponte Rule 11 sanction denies a lawyer the opportunity to withdraw the
challenged document pursuant to the "safe harbor" provision of Rule
11(c)(1)(A), the appropriate standard is subjective bad faith.
Id.
193 See id. at 91-92 (limiting the decision to the pending case's circumstances).
194 The Pennie court itself recognized the merits of the arguments for
expansion:
It is arguable... that a "bad faith" standard should apply to all court-
initiated Rule 11 sanctions because no "safe harbor" protection is available
and because the Advisory Committee contemplated such sanctions for
conduct akin to contempt. However, we need not make so broad a ruling in
the pending case.... We need not decide the standard for a sanction
proceeding initiated earlier in the litigation at a time when the challenged
submission could be corrected or withdrawn as part of the lawyer's
response to the show cause order, even though the Rule does not explicitly
guarantee a "safe harbor" protection in such circumstances.
RULE 11 SANCTIONS
1. Immediate Ramifications of In re Pennie & Edmonds'
Holding
If read narrowly as applying only to post-trial sanctions, the
Pennie decision should have little impact on the overall operation
of Rule 11. Since an attorney who contemplates filing the
"borderline motion" cannot predict at which point in the
litigation the court may issue the show cause order and,
therefore, cannot know what standard will be used to judge her
behavior, it is unlikely that the mere possibility that the
sanction proceedings will begin after there is an opportunity to
correct will be determinative of the decision to file such a motion.
Under the narrow reading of Pennie, the reasonableness of the
lawyer's conduct still can be evaluated by the court without the
protection of a "safe harbor."195 The application of a bad faith
standard only for post-trial sanctions, with the presence of the
threat of unavoidable sanctions for merely unreasonable
submissions during the litigation, may result in excusing some
conduct post hoc but will fail to alter lawyers' conduct at the
point when the filing of a questionable submission is
contemplated and, therefore, will not address the risk the Pennie
court was seeking to mitigate. 196
Yet, even the limited application of the Pennie ruling might
have negative implications on participants in the litigation
process. It is true that the underlying reason for the Second
Circuit's tightening of the standard for Rule 11 sanctions was to
provide more protection for attorneys who act in good faith from
the perceived harshness of the reasonableness standard when
the "safe harbor" protection does not apply. 197 However, one can
easily imagine situations in which the requirement of a bad faith
finding as a prerequisite for Rule 11 sanctions may actually have
195 Since the Pennie court limited its holding only to post-trial sua sponte
sanctions, see supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text, the reasonableness test
still applies to all other sanction proceedings-either on-motion or sua sponte-
initiated earlier in the litigation.
196 The court's intent was to minimize the risk "that lawyers will sometimes
withhold submissions that they honestly believe have plausible evidentiary support
for fear that a trial judge ... will erroneously consider their claimed belief to be
objectively unreasonable." In re Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 91. The imposition
of a bad faith standard for some sua sponte sanctions, but not for all, does not
remove the risk "that a trial judge.., will erroneously consider [the] claimed belief
to be objectively unreasonable." Id.
197 See id. at 89-91 (discussing the negative impact of sanctions when there is
no opportunity for lawyers to correct or withdraw the challenged submission).
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a greater negative impact on lawyers than Rule 11 would
otherwise afford.
First, the applicability of two distinct standards for
evaluating the same conduct, depending not on the timing of the
conduct, but on the timing of the evaluation, 198 may add to the
confusion surrounding Rule 11 sanctions. After In re Pennie &
Edmonds, a lawyer may get a false sense of security that her
good faith submissions are not sanctionable only to find herself,
prior to the conclusion of the case, facing a show cause order
without an opportunity to correct and automatically avoid
sanctions. 199
Second, the availability of the easier objective standard for
sanctions in the earlier stages of a litigation, as opposed to a
need to satisfy the more stringent subjective test later, may
prompt the court to "pre-judgef the merits of a claim, defense or
position before deciding the matter."200 The judge at this point
may issue a show cause order or invite a motion from the
adversary. 20 1 If the show cause order is issued, the attorney
could be forced to defend the merits of her submission even
before the court finds it to be frivolous.20 2 If the motion is filed
by the adversary in response to the court's prompting, the
attorney will get the protection of the "safe harbor," but she also
198 See supra note 195.
199 Some of the news reports about the case failed to make perfectly clear that
the court explicitly limited its holding to situations where corrective measures are
not feasible. See, e.g., Mark Hamblett, Panel Vacates False Affidavit Sanctions:
Pennie & Edmonds Had Acted in Good Faith, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 18, 2003, at 1 ("The
Second Circuit found that a district judge's belief that intellectual property firm
Pennie & Edmonds acted with subjective good faith meant that the firm should not
have been sanctioned."); David L. Hudson, Jr., A Good-Faith Belief in a Client's
Story: Firm That Filed False Affidavit Avoids Judge-Initiated Sanctions, 12 A.B.A.
J. E-REPORT, Mar. 28, 2003, at 3 (reporting that "[a]ttorneys cannot face Rule 11
sanctions initiated by a judge unless they act with subjectively bad faith").
200 Gregory P. Joseph, "Sua Sponte" Sanctions, NAT'L L.J., Apr. 14, 2003, at B6.
201 See id.; see also Methode Elecs., Inc. v. Adam Techs., Inc., No. 03 C 2971,
2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13049, at *10 (N.D. Ill. July 24, 2003) (providing an example
of a case where a motion for Rule 11 sanction was filed at the court's suggestion). In
this case defendants' lawyer "reacted with enthusiasm to the idea that his oral
motion for costs ... [could] only be addressed through a sanctions motion pursuant
to Rule 11," id. at *12, and filed such motion after the court stated in one of its
orders that it could "think of no basis other than Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, which would authorize sanctions." Id. at *10.
202 See Joseph, supra note 200 (noting also "that mere frivolousness of a
position is frequently an insufficient basis from which to infer bad faith").
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may face greater sanctions than would be available the court if
acted sua sponte.20 3
Third, there is a possibility that some judges will be simply
more willing to find bad faith behavior knowing that it is
required for sanctions. The Pennie court itself alluded to the
contentiousness of some trials 204 and to the possibility that a
judge might render an erroneous sanction decision. 20 5  The
judge's own immediate emotions 20 6 or personality traits,20 7 even
if unintentionally and somewhat subconsciously, may influence
the consideration process. The risk is actually greater when
sanctions proceedings are sua sponte because the issuance of a
show cause order by itself requires some predetermination that
the questioned conduct is sanctionable. 2° Since the same judge
who issues the show cause order is ultimately responsible for
deciding whether sanctions are warranted, it is conceivable that
some judges will find that the attorney has acted in bad faith
only because they feel strongly that the conduct must be
sanctioned. 20 9 While the extent of Rule 11 sanctions themselves,
203 See id. (discussing the ramifications of the Second Circuit decision in
Pennie).
[I]f [Pennie] leads judges to invite sanctions motions from adversaries
before the offending paper or position has been ultimately adjudicated,
that will have the consequence of circumventing the limitations that Rule
11(c)(2) places on sua sponte sanctions. A motion opens up the offender to
an award of attorney fees (which Rule 11(c)(2) always precludes when
sanctions issue sua sponte) or other monetary sanctions (which Rule
11(c)(2) precludes if a show-cause order issues post-adjudication).
Id.
204 See In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 91 (2d Cir. 2003) ("The risk
is that lawyers will sometimes withhold submissions that they honestly believe
have plausible evidentiary support for fear that a trial judge, perhaps at the
conclusion of a contentious trial, will erroneously consider their claimed belief to be
objectively unreasonable." (emphasis added)).
205 See id. (recognizing the possibility that "a judge would consider [some
submissions] objectively unreasonable ... that are objectively reasonable").
206 Judges are not immune from feelings and expressions of "impatience,
dissatisfaction, annoyance, and even anger, that are within the bounds of what
imperfect men and women, even after having been confirmed as federal judges,
sometimes display." Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555-56 (1994).
207 "[A] stern and short-tempered judged" is still a judge with the power to
render judgments. See id. at 556 (discussing whether judge's personal views and
temperament form a sufficient basis for disqualification).
208 See 2 MOORE ET AL., supra note 17, 11.23[3] ("If the court contemplates
imposing sanctions sua sponte, the court must issue an order specifically describing
the conduct that appears to violate Rule 11 and directing the attorney, law firm, or
party to show cause why he or she has not violated the rule.").
209 For example, it is possible that Judge Martin, knowing that in order for Rule
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at least theoretically, should not be any greater in such a
hypothetical situation,210 other consequences could be much
more detrimental. First, a finding by a federal court that an
attorney has acted in bad faith, if not reversed on appeal, 211
would have a greater negative impact on the violator's
reputation both in the public eye and within the profession than
would the finding of mere negligence. 212 Second, such a ruling
may be reported to a grievance committee, where a finding of
bad faith could weigh heavily against an attorney in any
disciplinary proceedings that might follow. 213 As a result, the
sanctioned lawyer may find herself in a worse position than she
would have been in if the trial judge possessed the authority to
11 sanctions to be imposed against Pennie & Edmonds' lawyers he had to make a
finding of bad faith, would not accept the lawyers' explanations as easily as he did
and, indeed, would find their submissions to be not just unreasonable but in bad
faith as well.
210 See FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2) ("A sanction imposed for violation of this rule
shall be limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of such conduct or
comparable conduct by others similarly situated."); Id. 11 advisory committee's note
(1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 587 (1993) ("[The sanctions should not be more
severe than reasonably necessary to deter repetition of the conduct by the offending
person or comparable conduct by similarly situated persons.").
211 Since a court's decision to award sanctions under Rule 11 for bad faith
submission can only be reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard for a clearly
erroneous assessment of the evidence, it would be a difficult task to attain the
reversal. See 2 MOORE ET AL., supra notel7, I 11.28[4][b]. The "abuse of discretion"
standard is extremely deferential to an opinion of the court below. See Whitehead v.
Food Max of Miss., Inc., 332 F.3d 796, 803 (5th Cir. 2003).
For this deferential review, the district court would necessarily abuse its
discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or on a
clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. Generally, an abuse of
discretion only occurs where no reasonable person could take the view
adopted by the trial court.
Id. (internal quotation marks, emphasis, and citations omitted).
212 The trial court's finding that Pennie & Edmonds' lawyers had acted
unreasonably was not disturbed by the Second Circuit. Nevertheless, in the absence
of a finding of bad faith, the firm could still claim that their conduct was
"vindicated." See Hudson, supra note 199, at 3 ("We are very happy that the firm
was vindicated .... The firm, as it always does, acted in subjective good faith."
(quoting John Normile, Co-Managing Partner at Pennie & Edmonds)).
213 See Vairo, supra note 9, 589, 633-36 (providing examples of cases in which
attorneys were reported to disciplinary committees by courts for violation of Rule 11
and discussing whether it is appropriate for courts to do so); see also Leslie W.
Abramson, The Judge's Ethical Duty to Report Misconduct by Other Judges and
Lawyers and its Effect on Judicial Independence, 25 HOFSTRA L. REV. 751, 755-60
(1997) (analyzing judges' ethical duty to report professional misconduct to the
appropriate disciplinary committees).
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impose Rule 11 sanctions based on the mere unreasonableness of
the submission.
Furthermore, resolution of the question of whether the
submission had adequate evidentiary support may require the
additional expense and time of a separate evidentiary hearing. 214
Consequently, the obligation to find subjective bad faith may, in
some cases, lead to more, not less litigation 215-an outcome that
is inconsistent with the general purpose of Rule 11 to
"streamline litigation."216
2. The Larger Impact of In re Pennie & Edmonds'Rationale
Although the Second Circuit explicitly limited the
applicability of the bad faith standard to post-trial show cause
orders,217 the purported boundaries of the court's decision are
illusory. An attorney who faces a show cause order during the
litigation is certainly free to withdraw an offending paper or
otherwise correct her filings. Rule 11, however, does not require
the court to take such corrective measures into consideration in
determining whether a violation of the rule has occurred. 218
Therefore, no corrective measures taken by the attorney at this
point can automatically preclude sanctions: the judge still has
the discretion to find a violation of the rule and impose
sanctions. To provide real protections, the Second Circuit will
either have to require district judges not to impose sanctions
when the offending filing is withdrawn in response to a show
214 See, e.g., Commercial Fin. Servs., Inc. v. Great Am. Ins. Co. of N.Y., No. 02
Civ. 7168, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9872, at *33 (S.D.N.Y. June 12, 2003) (following
In re Pennie & Edmonds and ordering an additional evidentiary hearing to
determine whether "counsel had adequate evidentiary support to bring the claims").
215 See Joseph, supra note 200 (explaining that "it is rare for a court to hold an
evidentiary hearing on a Rule 11 motion'"but if "bad faith must be shown, that fact
question may trigger a need for such a hearing.").
216 See Productos Mercantiles E Industriales, S.A. v. Faberge USA, Inc., 23 F.3d
41, 47 (2d Cir. 1994) ('The purpose of Rule 11 is to streamline litigation by
thwarting the use of frivolous and abusive trial tactics." (citing McMahon v.
Shearson, 896 F.2d 17, 22 (2d Cir. 1990))).
217 See supra notes 125-27 and accompanying text (discussing the Pennie
court's rationale in limiting its holding).
218 Corrective measures are only to be used in the determination of appropriate
sanctions, not to determine whether a violation has occurred. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11
advisory committee's note (1993), reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 592 (1993) ("Such
corrective action, however, should be taken into account in deciding what-if any-
sanction to impose if, after consideration of the litigant's response, the court
concludes that a violation has occurred.").
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cause order or to apply the bad faith standard in all sua sponte
Rule 11 proceedings.
The text of Rule 11 and the Advisory Committee's Note do
not support the imposition of a judicial "safe harbor"-allowing
lawyers to automatically avoid sanction by withdrawing the
offending document after the court-initiated show cause order.
On the contrary, the "safe harbor" for sua sponte sanctions was
unambiguously rejected by Rule l's drafters. 219 To impose a
"safe harbor" for court-initiated proceedings might also require
an independent determination by an appellate court (if there is
an appeal) that the sanctioning judge gave the lawyer the
opportunity to correct and then considered the corrective
measures in determining whether there was a violation. 220
It appears that the Second Circuit might be inclined to
expand the bad faith standard to all court-initiated Rule 11
sanction proceedings rather than impose a "safe harbor" for sua
sponte sanctions. First, the Pennie court based its conclusion on
the "akin to contempt" language in the Advisory Committee's
Note, which clearly refers to all court-initiated show cause
orders. 221 Second, the majority openly acknowledged the merits
of the argument for such expansion. 222 The court also recognized
that the drafters of Rule 11 rejected a proposal to provide "safe
harbor" protection to sua sponte sanctions. 223 If the Second
Circuit follows the Pennie rationale and adopts a subjective bad
faith standard for all sua sponte sanctions, that decision will
effectively remove judicial authority to sanction unreasonable
litigation conduct in many situations. An attorney will simply be
able to withdraw the offending submission if sanction
proceedings are on-motion or hide behind the "empty-head pure-
heart" defense if the court issues a show cause order sua
sponte.224 Merely unreasonable submissions, no matter how
219 See id. ("[T]he rule does not provide a 'safe harbor' to a litigant for
withdrawing a claim, defense, etc., after a show cause order has been issued on the
court's own initiative."); see also supra note 176.
220 The scope of such appellate review would fall outside the "abuse of
discretion" standard presently used in reviewing Rule 11 sanctions decisions. See
supra note 211.
221 See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
222 See supra text accompanying note 126; see also supra note 194 (recognizing
the merits of the arguments for expansion of the bad faith standard).
223 See In re Pennie & Edmonds LLP, 323 F.3d 86, 92 n.5 (2d Cir. 2003).
224 See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1993), reprinted in 146
F.R.D. 401, 586-87 (1993). An objective standard of reasonableness was in fact
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egregious, will be sanctionable only if the opposing counsel
serves a Rule 11 motion and the offending lawyer chooses not to
withdraw or correct the disputed paper. Such dilution of the
sanction regime may ultimately encourage meritless filings. 225
The final determination of what constitutes sanctionable
conduct, and consequently whether sanctions are warranted,
should not depend on the opposing counsel's decision to file a
motion. Attorneys' primary interest in litigation is advancing the
position of their clients. 226 The interest protected by Rule 11 is
the integrity of the legal process. 227 Since these interests are not
always perfectly aligned, 228 an attorney in some situations may
not file a Rule 11 motion even when the opposing counsel's
conduct truly is frivolous. In contrast, judges generally are in a
better position to assess the impact of questionable litigation
conduct 229 and have the responsibility to maintain the integrity
of the legal process. 230 It seems illogical to remove the sanction
mechanism that can reach unreasonable conduct and is the most
powerful tool available to protect courts from frivolous
"intended to eliminate any 'empty-head pure-heart' justification for patently
frivolous arguments." Id.
225 The Pennie majority properly noted that "if the sanction regime is too
lenient, lawyers will sometimes be emboldened to make improper submissions on
behalf of clients, confident that their misconduct will either be undetected or dealt
with too leniently to matter." In re Pennie & Edmonds, 323 F.3d at 91.
226 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
227 See Bus. Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters., 498 U.S. 533,
542 (1991) ("Rule 11 is 'aimed at curbing abuses of the judicial system.'" (citing
Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 397 (1990))); Vairo, supra note 9, at
600 ("Rule 11 was designed to give district court judges an effective tool to cut down
on the abuses that often accompany federal litigation."); supra notes 44, 45 and
accompanying text (discussing Rule ll's purpose); supra notes 162-66 and
accompanying text (describing Rule 1l's goal to protect courts, not attorneys).
228 See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
229 See Maureen N. Armour, Practice Makes Perfect: Judicial Discretion and the
1993 Amendments to Rule 11, 24 HOFSTRA L. REV. 677, 688-89 (1996) (noting that
sanctions are often "delegated to the trial courts' discretion because of their
perceived skill and institutional expertise in handling them").
230 See Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10175, 2002 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 491, at *16 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 16, 2002) (pointing out that "the Court as an
institution has a far greater interest in weeding out abuses than does any individual
litigant"). The American Bar Association's voiced its position on the role of judges in
the litigation process. See ABA Comm. on Professionalism, Report to the House of
Delegates (1986), reprinted in 112 F.R.D. 243, 264-65 (1987) ("Trial judges should
take a more active role in the conduct of litigation. They should see that cases
advance promptly, fairly and without abuse .... Judges should impose sanctions for
abuse of the litigation process.").
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submissions from judges and place it exclusively into the hands
of litigants for whom the integrity of the legal process might only
be a secondary responsibility.
V. PROVIDING MEANINGFUL PROTECTIONS FROM SANCTIONS TO
LAWYERS ACTING IN GOOD FAITH WITHIN
THE FRAMEWORK OF RULE 11
Despite the questionable remedy adopted by the Pennie
court,231 the problem itself is not imaginary-there is a real
possibility that in some situations lawyers will withhold
otherwise plausible submissions for fear of court-initiated
sanctions. 232 Are there mechanisms, besides the "safe harbor,"
that may protect lawyers acting in good faith from the undue
hardship of Rule 11 sanctions without creating a separate
standard for assessing sanctionable conduct? The answer
appears to be "yes."
Rule 11 has intrinsic constraints that limit courts' power in
a meaningful way. Lawyers, of course, are not asked to be
perfect, just reasonable-Rule 11(b) only imposes the duty to
conduct "an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances."233 To
determine the reasonableness of the investigation, courts
evaluate how much time was available to the signer before filing,
whether the lawyer had to rely on a client for information,
whether the paper was based on a plausible view of the law, and
the extent to which factual development required discovery. 234
This flexible approach protects lawyers and precludes sanctions
in at least some cases. 235 To reduce the risk of Rule 11 sanctions,
lawyers can also take certain relatively simple precautionary
steps. 236
231 See supra Part III (criticizing the imposition of the subjective bad faith
standard for sua sponte Rule 11 sanctions).
232 See supra notes 60, 179.
233 FED. R. Civ. P. 1l(b).
234 See Jones v. Int'l Riding Helmets, Ltd., 49 F.3d 692, 695 (11th Cir. 1995).
235 See, e.g., Dubois v. United States Dep't of Agric., 270 F.3d 77, 82-83 (1st Cir.
2001) (refusing sanctions for failure to investigate when attorneys reasonably relied
on technical expertise of their client); CTC Imports & Exports v. Nigerian
Petroleum Corp., 951 F.2d 573, 579 (3d Cir. 1991) (denying sanctions when a lawyer
had less than twenty-four hours to investigate the facts); Salzmann v. Prudential
Sec. Inc., No. 91 Civ. 4253, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6377, at *42 n.12 (S.D.N.Y. May
13, 1994) (giving an offender "benefit of the doubt" and denying motion for sanctions
because of the complexity of issues).
236 See generally DESSEM, supra note 56, at 163-64 (providing tips on
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Rule 11 has internal limitations on the kind of sanctions
that can be imposed. The principle that sanctions "shall be
limited to what is sufficient to deter repetition of [inappropriate]
conduct,"237 although not a shield from sanctions, may mitigate
the burden imposed on an attorney, especially if she acted in
good faith.238 The prohibition on attorney fee shifting by sua
sponte sanctions proceedings 239 also can be considered a
mitigating factor in the context of Rule 11 sanctions. 240
In addition to Rule l1's "built-in" constraints, 241 there are
alternative interpretations of Rule 11 that would effectively
protect attorneys for whom the "safe harbor" is not available. As
an alternative to the Second Circuit's mens rea rule, noted
commentator Gregory P. Joseph suggested that an attorney's
conduct should be deemed reasonable unless the client's story is
incredible as a matter of law.242 In cases where the issue is
assessment of a client's credibility, the Second Circuit itself has
recognized the difficulty of determining a client's untruthfulness
and ruled that the client's testimony must be "incredible as a
matter of law" before sanctions may be applied. 243 Such focus on
preventive measures against Rule 11 sanctions). Professor Dessem's list includes:
good record-keeping, preparedness to explain the conduct in question, adopting
internal review procedures for law firms, and counseling clients of Rule 11
implications. Id. at 163. Such "good lawyering" steps might be beneficial regardless
of whether there is a threat of sanctions. Id.
237 FED. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2).
238 Judge Martin, explaining the mild character of sanctions imposed against
Pennie & Edmonds, pointed out that "[g]iven Pennie & Edmonds' reputation and its
candor in these proceedings, the Court is persuaded that little sanction beyond the
publication of this Opinion is required to prevent repetition of similar conduct."
Patsy's Brand, Inc. v. I.O.B. Realty, Inc., No. 99 Civ. 10175, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
491, at *27 (S.D.N.Y Jan. 16, 2002). In some cases, courts limited sanctions to mere
warnings, reprimands, or admonitions. See, e.g., Langer v. Monarch Life Ins. Co.,
966 F.2d 786, 810-12 (3d Cir. 1992) (issuing a reprimand); Westfield Partners, Ltd.
v. Hogan, 744 F. Supp. 189, 193 (N.D. Ill. 1990) (deciding in favor of censure). See
generally Vairo, supra note 9, at 633, 641-42 (discussing the benefits of less severe
Rule 11 sanctions).
239 See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
240 Professor Hart's research showed that some federal courts do award
attorney fees on their own initiative in violation of the plain language of Rule 11.
See Hart, supra note 60, at 70-71. It is a responsibility of appellate courts to ensure
that orders to show cause are not used as cost-shifting measure. Id. at 71-72. To
mitigate the "chilling" problem, "attorneys' fees cannot, and must not, be awarded
pursuant to an order to show cause." Id. at 129 (emphasis omitted).
241 See supra text accompanying notes 233-40.
242 See Joseph, supra note 200.
243 See Mar Oil, S.A. v. Morrissey, 982 F.2d 830, 844 (2d Cir. 1993); Healey v.
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the credibility of a client's story, instead of an attorney's state of
mind, would allow the court to avoid sanctioning lawyers in
situations, similar to the one in Pennie, where the
reasonableness of reliance on the client's statement is
questioned. 44
The alternative solution for the court that wants to "protect"
an attorney who acted unreasonably but in good faith would be
to find that the conduct of the attorney was not "akin to
contempt." For example, in Kaplan v. DaimlerChrysler A.G., 245
the Eleventh Circuit resolved the case and reversed sua sponte
Rule 11 sanctions on the basis that the attorney's conduct was
not "akin to contempt" and therefore the state of mind of the
sanctioned attorney was irrelevant. 246 The Kaplan court focused
its analysis on the effect of unreasonable filings on the
litigation 247 and concluded that the offending submissions fell
short of contempt level. 248 Similarly, in In re Pennie &
Edmonds, the Second Circuit could have evaluated the effect of
the submissions on the litigation and the overall conduct of the
Chelsea Res. Ltd., 947 F.2d 611, 626 (2d Cir. 1991). The Second Circuit in Healey
refused to uphold sanctions against an attorney for failing to mitigate the false
testimony of his client when such testimony "was not incredible as a matter of law."
Id.
244 See Joseph, supra note 200 (arguing that the better solution would be if
"[t]he Pennie majority could have determined that the testimony at issue was not
sufficiently incredible to warrant sanctions, without doing violence to the text of
Rule 11").
245 331 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2003).
246 The court in Kaplan reversed the district court's Rule 11 sua sponte order
imposing sanctions for filing unnecessary and frivolous in limine motions on the eve
of the trial. Id. at 1254, 1257. While technically the sanctions were imposed during
the trial, the defendant's counsel could not withdraw in limine motions after the
trial began and, therefore, the situation could be compared to the Pennie post-trial
sanctions.
247 See id. at 1256. The court stated that:
No doubt those late filings irritated and inconvenienced both the court and
plaintiffs' counsel, but seven were moot and thus consumed an
inconsequential amount of the court's time, while the remainder could
have simply been denied as untimely, if not carried with the case and
decided via contemporaneous objection at trial.
Id.
248 See id. (finding that defendants' "actions were abusive, but not 'over the top,'
much less akin to contempt" and that "[w] [defendant's] motion may have been
overkill, it simply cannot be said to meet the contempt-of-court level"). Kaplan
actually acknowledges In re Pennie & Edmonds, recognizing that "akin to contempt"
standard is applicable to sua sponte proceedings, but stops short of holding that the
"akin to contempt" standard requires a finding of bad faith. See id. at 1255-56.
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lawyers in the case and concluded that, taken as a whole, the
conduct was not akin to contempt, even though the particular
submission was in fact unreasonable.
The proper evaluation of whether sua sponte Rule 11
sanctions are warranted should concentrate on the nature of the
offending conduct or filed document, the overall effect of the
submission on the litigation, and the attorney's explanations
during show cause proceedings and not on the attorney's
subjective beliefs. This approach would allow the courts to be
forgiving and reverse sanctions in deserving cases, while
preserving the mechanism for punishing lawyers for more
egregious conduct.
CONCLUSION
With the introduction of the objective standard of
reasonableness for determining whether sanctions under Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are warranted, the
federal judiciary received a powerful weapon with which to fight
litigation abuses associated with the filing of frivolous pleadings
and other papers. The weapon in fact proved to be so powerful
that its use led to some collateral damage-legitimate claims
were chilled and a cottage litigation industry flourished. The
1993 amendments were designed to insert some safety
mechanisms to curtail the careless overuse of Rule 11 sanctions.
The amendments, however, never intended to remove the ability
of the courts to punish unreasonable conduct. As with any
weapon, the true value of Rule 11 sanctions is not in their actual
use but in the deterrent effect they provide.
The recent decision by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit in In re Pennie & Edmonds has the
potential not only to limit the effectiveness of Rule 11 sanctions,
but also to take away the courts' power to penalize attorneys for
meritless submissions. The requirement of subjective bad faith
as a prerequisite for court-initiated Rule 11 sanctions in effect
puts the trigger for proceedings that may reach unreasonable
litigation conduct exclusively into the hands of the adversaries
and, consequently, courts in some cases may find themselves
powerless to sanction attorneys who act in good faith no matter
how egregious their offending conduct.
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DEAN JOSEPH W. BELLACOSA
This issue is dedicated to Joseph W. Bellacosa,
who stepped down as Dean of St. John's University
School of Law in August of 2004. His many years of dedicated
service to St. John's, and especially the past four as Dean, have
had an incalculable impact on this institution. We are pleased
to publish the following tributes to Dean Bellacosa as an
expression of our gratitude for his work.
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